Is Adaptation an Option?
David L. Bevett, BS, MPH
March 16, 2002
The world is changing more and faster everyday, and another piece of the cornerstone of what
people believe to be reality is chipped away: War, floods, famine, unemployment, hyper-global-
competition, exponential technological innovation. And in July 2001, as we confirmed a mid-
September launch date for a major product release, a part of our reality was soon to be tested. On the
morning of September 11, 2001, we were faced with a dilemma: do we still launch our product after
the attacks? No one could have anticipated that the launch date we had chosen would coincide with
an event that signaled the loss of America’s innocence and forever changed the world. The complex,
inextricable links between politics, business, and technology were crystallized. After phone calls,
emergency meetings, and reflection we decided that business had to continue, we needed to adapt to
the situation, stay on target and launch the product. And the events of that day lead one to question:
In today’s ever-changing world, plagued with a level of socio-economic uncertainty bordering on
chaos, is adaptation an option?
The weeks leading up to September 11, 2001 had been filled with problem-solving, regrouping,
conflict resolution, 15 hour days and overnight work marathons. A number of the stakeholder issues
avoided or not addressed early in the project were coming to the surface. Promises were made by
marketing groups on both the client and consultant side to other stakeholders within the corporation
to ensure buy-in and investment. The main issues were that stakeholders were guaranteed autonomy
while the project goal was integration, and they did not have the technical background to recognize
the complexity being introduced. From that point, there were equal and opposite forces pulling on the
project: create a product that provides autonomy and seamless integration.
The driving force behind the guarantees of autonomy to the managers of the subsidiaries and
integration to the CEO was politics: the subsidiaries wanted to maintain their autonomy and the CEO
was positioning the company to become more integrated. To win the contract, the product concept
was marketed to the relatively techno-phobic management team as being able to accomplish both
objectives with minimal compromise to the quality of the final product. Thus, from the onset there
was a difficult obstacle to overcome; especially in such a politically-charged environment.
Furthermore, this was a major information technology project being developed for a non-technical
company, and “Increasingly unpredictable and rapid change follows un-avoidably from doing
business in an Information Age” (Haeckel, 1999, p.xvii). Therefore, we were not solely charged to
develop a product; we were responsible for bringing a company into the Information Age.
The first stage of the product development process involved interviews and data collection to identify
business processes, existing information resources, and client goals to develop a project plan.
However, due to the client’s lack of experience with technology projects and the political nature of
the organization, this came across as more of an inquisition. Hence, several of the subsidiaries
understandingly withheld information or only half-heartedly filled out questionnaires to communicate
their specific processes, resources, and goals. Yet, to ensure that we incorporated all of the
stakeholders’ data sources and goals into the overall project plan, we needed the information prior to
moving forward: one of the first signs of the opposing forces of autonomy-integration. Unfortunately
for the client, “The value of software resides in intellectual content captured as symbols in computer
code…” (Haeckel, 1999, p.2). Hence, the less information they shared, the lower the value of the
software developed for them.
The ultimate value of the product would be in direct proportion to the accuracy and quality of the
information provided. For example, a poorly defined off-line business process translated to an on-line
medium is likely to be equally ill-defined. Therefore, during client interviews it was critical to ask
probing questions about how they performed a specific process or what their goals for consumer or
business data collection were. In essence, we were there to help them define and leverage their
intellectual capital. And according to Haeckel, “… today, global wealth derives from codified
knowledge and the ability to manipulate it at electronic speed” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 2). However, asking
critical questions and pulling the client into the information technology world disrupted their sense of
balance, “Because these intangibles can be transformed and transmitted so quickly, rapid and
discontinuous change has become the hallmark of information-intensive industries” (p.2). And the
client had not anticipated or prepared for the change.
The responsibility of guiding a political organization into the Information Age while executing a
strategic-level technology project was greater than we anticipated. This dynamic, coupled with the
size and complexity of the client’s organization and the autonomy-integration paradox, overwhelmed
several of our product development methodologies and processes. To provide autonomy for each
subsidiary we had to develop custom applications, yet create enough structure for future integration.
However, “A system cannot be improved, much less transformed, by making isolated adjustments to
individual capabilities” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 21). And since “Human organizations are not like flocks of
birds or hurricanes or wolf packs,” the subsidiaries could and did “…make conscious choices that
[were] inconsistent with the system’s purpose” (p. 43). Yet we did not have the authority to enforce
integration, we could only influence.
Not all change should be considered beneficial or necessary, but without it failure is inevitable; and
regardless of the efforts to prevent or suppress the forces of change, it will occur, because change is
the essence of life itself. According to Haeckel (1999), “Information and information technology [are]
increasing the speed of change” (p.51). Consequently, either the client or our organization had to
adapt or change: “But neither logic nor experience support the assertion that large, complex
corporations can self-organize to produce purposeful strategic behavior” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 11). And
since “Failure occurs when the agreement cannot be adapted in a manner satisfactory to both
parties,” to succeed we had to adapt (p.68). Fortunately, we were somewhat prepared because the
fast pace of hi-tech business had already acclimated our company to dealing with the level of
dynamic adaptation required to be successful.
In the end, we had to petition the CEO to unofficially become “…the leader guiding the change [and]
maintain a focus on the whole and on the interactions of the parts,” and try to influence the
subsidiaries to “…align behind the same purpose…” (p.71). And from that point, we set our course
“To turn this collection [of disparate goals and objectives] into a successful enterprise, [and] the
outcomes produced by the capabilities must be orchestrated into a coherent system” (Haeckel, 1999,
p. 93). Late in the evening on September 10, 2001, during final testing we talked about relief, project
challenges, and agreed that sometimes customers literally do not know what they need (79). So as I
awoke on the morning of September 11th, on the day of the long awaited international web portal
launch, I heard a surreal message on the radio: “New York is under attack.” I turned on the TV and
saw footage of the airplanes crashing and Twin Towers burning. Suddenly, the challenges and
politics of the project faded away and a new reality set in: adaptation is no longer an option.
References
Haeckel, S. (1999). Adaptive Enterprise. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
David L. Bevett, BS, MPH
March 16, 2002
The world is changing more and faster everyday, and another piece of the cornerstone of what
people believe to be reality is chipped away: War, floods, famine, unemployment, hyper-global-
competition, exponential technological innovation. And in July 2001, as we confirmed a mid-
September launch date for a major product release, a part of our reality was soon to be tested. On the
morning of September 11, 2001, we were faced with a dilemma: do we still launch our product after
the attacks? No one could have anticipated that the launch date we had chosen would coincide with
an event that signaled the loss of America’s innocence and forever changed the world. The complex,
inextricable links between politics, business, and technology were crystallized. After phone calls,
emergency meetings, and reflection we decided that business had to continue, we needed to adapt to
the situation, stay on target and launch the product. And the events of that day lead one to question:
In today’s ever-changing world, plagued with a level of socio-economic uncertainty bordering on
chaos, is adaptation an option?
The weeks leading up to September 11, 2001 had been filled with problem-solving, regrouping,
conflict resolution, 15 hour days and overnight work marathons. A number of the stakeholder issues
avoided or not addressed early in the project were coming to the surface. Promises were made by
marketing groups on both the client and consultant side to other stakeholders within the corporation
to ensure buy-in and investment. The main issues were that stakeholders were guaranteed autonomy
while the project goal was integration, and they did not have the technical background to recognize
the complexity being introduced. From that point, there were equal and opposite forces pulling on the
project: create a product that provides autonomy and seamless integration.
The driving force behind the guarantees of autonomy to the managers of the subsidiaries and
integration to the CEO was politics: the subsidiaries wanted to maintain their autonomy and the CEO
was positioning the company to become more integrated. To win the contract, the product concept
was marketed to the relatively techno-phobic management team as being able to accomplish both
objectives with minimal compromise to the quality of the final product. Thus, from the onset there
was a difficult obstacle to overcome; especially in such a politically-charged environment.
Furthermore, this was a major information technology project being developed for a non-technical
company, and “Increasingly unpredictable and rapid change follows un-avoidably from doing
business in an Information Age” (Haeckel, 1999, p.xvii). Therefore, we were not solely charged to
develop a product; we were responsible for bringing a company into the Information Age.
The first stage of the product development process involved interviews and data collection to identify
business processes, existing information resources, and client goals to develop a project plan.
However, due to the client’s lack of experience with technology projects and the political nature of
the organization, this came across as more of an inquisition. Hence, several of the subsidiaries
understandingly withheld information or only half-heartedly filled out questionnaires to communicate
their specific processes, resources, and goals. Yet, to ensure that we incorporated all of the
stakeholders’ data sources and goals into the overall project plan, we needed the information prior to
moving forward: one of the first signs of the opposing forces of autonomy-integration. Unfortunately
for the client, “The value of software resides in intellectual content captured as symbols in computer
code…” (Haeckel, 1999, p.2). Hence, the less information they shared, the lower the value of the
software developed for them.
The ultimate value of the product would be in direct proportion to the accuracy and quality of the
information provided. For example, a poorly defined off-line business process translated to an on-line
medium is likely to be equally ill-defined. Therefore, during client interviews it was critical to ask
probing questions about how they performed a specific process or what their goals for consumer or
business data collection were. In essence, we were there to help them define and leverage their
intellectual capital. And according to Haeckel, “… today, global wealth derives from codified
knowledge and the ability to manipulate it at electronic speed” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 2). However, asking
critical questions and pulling the client into the information technology world disrupted their sense of
balance, “Because these intangibles can be transformed and transmitted so quickly, rapid and
discontinuous change has become the hallmark of information-intensive industries” (p.2). And the
client had not anticipated or prepared for the change.
The responsibility of guiding a political organization into the Information Age while executing a
strategic-level technology project was greater than we anticipated. This dynamic, coupled with the
size and complexity of the client’s organization and the autonomy-integration paradox, overwhelmed
several of our product development methodologies and processes. To provide autonomy for each
subsidiary we had to develop custom applications, yet create enough structure for future integration.
However, “A system cannot be improved, much less transformed, by making isolated adjustments to
individual capabilities” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 21). And since “Human organizations are not like flocks of
birds or hurricanes or wolf packs,” the subsidiaries could and did “…make conscious choices that
[were] inconsistent with the system’s purpose” (p. 43). Yet we did not have the authority to enforce
integration, we could only influence.
Not all change should be considered beneficial or necessary, but without it failure is inevitable; and
regardless of the efforts to prevent or suppress the forces of change, it will occur, because change is
the essence of life itself. According to Haeckel (1999), “Information and information technology [are]
increasing the speed of change” (p.51). Consequently, either the client or our organization had to
adapt or change: “But neither logic nor experience support the assertion that large, complex
corporations can self-organize to produce purposeful strategic behavior” (Haeckel, 1999, p. 11). And
since “Failure occurs when the agreement cannot be adapted in a manner satisfactory to both
parties,” to succeed we had to adapt (p.68). Fortunately, we were somewhat prepared because the
fast pace of hi-tech business had already acclimated our company to dealing with the level of
dynamic adaptation required to be successful.
In the end, we had to petition the CEO to unofficially become “…the leader guiding the change [and]
maintain a focus on the whole and on the interactions of the parts,” and try to influence the
subsidiaries to “…align behind the same purpose…” (p.71). And from that point, we set our course
“To turn this collection [of disparate goals and objectives] into a successful enterprise, [and] the
outcomes produced by the capabilities must be orchestrated into a coherent system” (Haeckel, 1999,
p. 93). Late in the evening on September 10, 2001, during final testing we talked about relief, project
challenges, and agreed that sometimes customers literally do not know what they need (79). So as I
awoke on the morning of September 11th, on the day of the long awaited international web portal
launch, I heard a surreal message on the radio: “New York is under attack.” I turned on the TV and
saw footage of the airplanes crashing and Twin Towers burning. Suddenly, the challenges and
politics of the project faded away and a new reality set in: adaptation is no longer an option.
References
Haeckel, S. (1999). Adaptive Enterprise. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
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